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ABSTRACT 
While much prior research has focused upon how Technology Transfer Offices and other 
contextual characteristics shape the level of university spinoffs (USO), there is little research 
on entrepreneurial potential among individual academics, and to the best of our knowledge, 
no comparative studies with other types of spinoffs exist to date. In this paper we focus on an 
important but neglected aspect of knowledge transfer from academic research involving the 
indirect flow to entrepreneurship by individuals with a university education background who 
become involved in new venture creation by means of corporate spinoffs (CSO) after gaining 
industrial experience, rather than leaving university employment to found a new venture as an 
academic spinoff. The commercial knowledge gained in industry is potentially more valuable 
for entrepreneurial performance compared to the academic knowledge gained by additional 
research experience at a university. This leads us to posit that the average performance of 
CSOs will be higher than comparable USOs, but the gains from founder‘s prior experiences 
will  be  relatively  higher  among  USOs  whose  founders  lack  the  corporate  context.  We 
investigate these propositions in a comparative study tracking the complete population of 
USOs and CSOs among the Swedish knowledge-intensive sectors between 1994 and 2002.  
  
1.Introduction 
The  Bayh-Dole  Act  of  1980  was  intended  to  facilitate  that  knowledge  created  at 
universities  would  spill  over  to  the  benefit  of  the  public  (Mowery,  Nelson,  Sampat  and 
Ziedonis, 2004). Evidence seems to suggest that at least to some extent these intentions were 
fulfilled. Patenting activity of universities has increased as has revenues from the licensing of 
intellectual property (Merrill and Mazza, 2010). Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) have 
been established to assure professional commercialization of the knowledge generated within 
the universities.  With the US leading the way, similar efforts have been pursued around the 
world (see Guena and Rossi, 2011, this issue). These developments have received extensive 
scholarly attention (for reviews see Link and Siegel, 2005; Siegel, Veugelers and Wright, 
2007; Rothaermel, Agung and Jiang, 2007). Initially, scholars focused largely on the direct 
implications  of  licensing  and  patenting.  To  an  increasing  extent,  however,  it  has  been 
recognized that this may be an overly narrow view of university knowledge spillover (Shane, 
2004; Lockett, Siegel, Wright and Ensley, 2005).  Therefore, growing emphasis has been 
placed on university spinoffs created by scientists based on intellectual property generated in 
the university (see for example the special issue of Research Policy edited by Lockett, Siegel,   3 
Wright and Ensley, 2005). With examples of successful university spinoffs such as Google 
and  Genentech  each  generating  billions  of  dollars  of  revenue  within  a  few  years  of 
establishment, this attention is easily understood. More generally, thanks to their learning 
from long periods of education and advanced work experience, academics possess substantial 
human capital and often have access to advanced technologies and innovations, which could 
provide them with unique qualities for starting and operating new ventures with the potential 
of  creating  substantial  growth  and  economic  value.  Consequently,  most  governments  are 
targeting  the  creation  and  growth  of  knowledge  intensive  firms  and  find  academic 
entrepreneurship  particularly  promising  in  this  regard  (see  Wright  et  al.  2008,  ch2.  for  a 
review). 
While both policy and scholarly interest in university spinoffs is easily understood, it 
provides a relatively limited view of university knowledge spillover (Lester, 2005). Arguably, 
most university knowledge spillover is indirect (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). For example, the 
education of students is the major task of most universities and the value of that knowledge is 
exploited during later employment. Comparing the magnitude of the total direct and indirect 
knowledge spillover of universities is indeed no easy task. It is, however, possible to assess 
and compare the impact of spinoffs that directly or indirectly utilize knowledge generated by 
universities. Given the policy interest in university spinoffs and the intention of the Bayh-
Dole Act to facilitate direct university knowledge spillover to the benefit of society, we feel 
that this is a valuable exercise. We suggest that there are two paths to knowledge-intensive 
entrepreneurship based on university knowledge. The first is the direct path where individuals 
first study, then work at universities and subsequently spin off their business directly from the 
university. We refer to spinoffs taking this direct path as university spinoffs (USOs). The 
second path is represented by university graduates who pursue careers in private industry and   4 
spin off their companies from that context (Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). We refer to 
those as corporate spinoffs (CSOs).   
As far as we are aware, little research has examined the relative effectiveness of these 
two paths to knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship (USOs and CSOs). The two exceptions 
are the studies by Zahra et al. (2007) and Clarysse et al. (2011) that investigated performance 
differences  between  USOs  and  CSOs  on  small  samples  of  relatively  more  established 
spinoffs. Further, a small number of other studies have compared USOs with non-USO start-
ups  (Ensley  and  Hmieleski,  2005;  Colombo  and  Piva,  2008).  Our  study  differs  from  the 
Clarysse et al. and the Zahra et al. studies that focused on relatively more established spinoffs. 
We take a broader perspective and look at a whole population of spinoffs from their very 
inception. Hence, we are able to draw inferences not just about how USOs and CSOs differ 
but also to gauge the relative impact of such firms. As such, our study carries a higher degree 
of generalizability to the overall economy. 
The lack of broader perspectives on performance differences across types of spinoffs 
in the literature is surprising for three main reasons: First, a very large number of studies have 
attempted  to  evaluate  the  economic  impact  of  university-based  entrepreneurship  (cf. 
Rothaermel, et al., 2007; Siegel et al., 2007). In order for such undertakings to be relevant, a 
suitable baseline for comparison needs to be established. The comparison of entrepreneurial 
activities  of  knowledge-workers  from  the  private  sector,  specifically  in  the  context  of 
corporate spinoffs (CSOs) represents such a baseline. Second, in many countries, millions if 
not  billions of tax dollars are spent on efforts targeting university-based entrepreneurship 
(Wright et al., 2008a,b). Such policy efforts only make sense if this kind of entrepreneurship 
does indeed represent an effective way of establishing knowledge-intensive firms with growth 
potential.  Third,  the  spillover  benefits  through  corporate  spinoffs  following  industrial 
experience by knowledge workers may have implications for the design and assessment of   5 
labor market legislation such as non-compete covenants. Hence, comparative examination of 
the performance of USOs and CSOs has important policy implications. We undertake this 
comparison using a unique longitudinal dataset that tracks the complete population of USOs 
and  CSOs  among  the  Swedish  high-tech  sectors  between  1990  and  2002.  The  Swedish 
context is a particularly interesting one in which to conduct this analysis given the provision 
of the Bayh-Dole Act and the debate over inventor ownership (Kenney and Patton, 2009; 
Merrill and Mazza, 2010) since in Sweden, ownership of university IP is vested with the 
inventor.    Further,  Sweden  is  a  country  that  invests  substantial  amounts  of  money  in 
supporting academic spinoffs, and does so primarily through the USO mechanism (Karlsson 
and Wigren, 2010). Finally, Sweden is known for its extensive and high quality data which 
facilitates  the  construction  of  the  relevant  databases.  This  dataset  also  has  the  important 
attribute that, unlike many other studies of university spinoffs (Kenney and Patton, 2009), it 
does not rely on data provided by TTOs which may understate the extent of spinoff activity. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on the nature and impact of 
university research commercialization. First, we add to the debate about the effectiveness of 
the commercialization of the knowledge and IP generated by universities by identifying and 
separating two different mechanisms for achieving this goal, i.e., USOs and CSOs. To date, 
research has mainly focused on USOs to the exclusion of CSOs. Given that we find that CSOs 
outnumber USOs 14 to 1, our paper represents a very significant shift of focus on an area 
where university education contributes but which has been neglected. Second, we provide 
robust empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the two mechanisms. This evidence has 
important  implications  for  public  policy  related  to  the  support  of  commercialization  of 
university knowledge, in particular as we find that CSOs outperform USOs across a number 
of  different  performance  measures.  Third,  we  focus  specifically  on  characteristics  of  the 
parent organization from which spinoffs are spawned and thus tap into a growing strand of   6 
research on how knowledge spills over from established organizations into new organizations 
(Acs et al., 2009; Agarwal et al., 2007). Specifically, we contribute to this spawning literature 
by  investigating  how  characteristics  of  the  parent  organization  foster  not  only  spinoff 
formation (Sorensen, 2007) and survival (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) 
but also the growth of spinoffs, both in terms of sales and employees. Thus, our research 
informs  the  specific  debate  about  the  consequences  of  the  Bayh-Dole  Act  particularly  in 
relation to the ownership of university generated knowledge and IP, and the modes through 
which it is both transferred and used to create social and economic value.  
The paper unfolds as follows. First, in the following section we outline our theoretical 
framework and develop testable hypotheses.  Second, we outline our data source and the 
method  of  analysis.  Third,  we  present  our  analysis.  In  a  final  section  we  discuss  the 
implications of our findings for further research and for policy. 
 
2.Theory and hypotheses 
2.1.University-Based Entrepreneurship 
The  principal  focus  of  research  on  the  spillover  of  knowledge  from  universities  into 
entrepreneurship  has  been  on  USOs  because  it  is  easily  controlled  by  policy  makers. 
Considerable debate has concerned the performance of USOs (Siegel et al., 2007; Colombo et 
al.,  2010).  Central  to  this  line  of  research  is  that  academic  entrepreneurship  is  strongly 
context-dependent.
1  A number of contextual factors have been identified as important if 
ventures emerging from a non-commercial environment are to grow (Vohora et al., 2004). For 
example, the extent to which scientists in a particular discipline engage in entrepreneurship 
(Stuart  and  Ding,  2006;  Bercovitz  and  Feldman,  2008)  and  the nature  of  the resource 
endowments provided by the university environment (Mustar et al., 2006; Di Gregorio and 
                                                 
1 This has also been proposed in the broader area of entrepreneurship studies (Thornton, 1999).   7 
Shane, 2003), including the capabilities and routines of TTOs (Lockett and Wright, 2005) and 
technological  resources  available  (Heirman  and  Clarysse,  2004),  have  been  identified  as 
important.  This  line  of  research  has  mainly  focused  upon  the  contextual  effects  of  the 
university and the TTO.  
The emphasis in this literature so far has generally been on enterprise creation and not 
subsequent performance. The few existing studies investigating the performance of USOs 
have  identified  specific  resources  and  capabilities  associated  with  university  spinoff 
development such as intellectual human capital (Zucker, Darby, & Brewer, 1998; Siegel et al., 
2007). For example, Colombo and Grilli (2005) find that individual academics‘ experience 
and team size facilitated the growth of technology-based new firms in Italy. However, this 
study  did  not  distinguish  USOs  and  non-USOs.  A  subsequent  study  by  Colombo  et  al. 
(2010b)  shows  that  the  science  quality  of  local  universities  has  a  positive  effect  but  the 
commercial orientation of research has a negative effect on the growth of USOs. This study 
suggests that USOs with more scientific orientation in their entrepreneurial team have greater 
absorptive capacity to assimilate scientific knowledge. In an earlier study, Colombo and Piva 
(2008) also showed that USOs‘ founding teams exhibit greater scientific education and prior 
research experience than teams in non-USOs.  
A  US  study  by  Ensley  and  Hmieleski  (2005)  finds  that  USOs  comprise  more 
homogeneous top management teams (TMTs) with less developed dynamics, such as shared 
cognition and conflict, and had lower performance than independent new ventures. However, 
this  study did  not  specifically  identify  the roles of team  human  capital in  terms  of prior 
commercial and educational experiences.   
We know of only two studies directly comparing USOs and CSOs. Clarysse et al. 
(2011) examine the relationship between technological knowledge of parent firms on the sales 
and employment growth of 48 CSOs and 73 USOs. This study measured growth only at one   8 
point in time and focused on relatively more established spinoffs. Zahra et al. (2007) surveyed 
a sample of 78 USOs and 91 CSOs in the U.S. They found that USOs and CSOs differed 
systematically  in  how  they  utilized  a  variety  of  self-reported  ‖knowledge  conversion 
capabilities‖  and  that  these  capabilities  benefited  CSOs  to  a  higher  extent  in  terms  of 
productivity, revenue growth and return on assets. This study was conducted exclusively at 
the firm level of analysis and also focused on relatively more established spinoffs that had 
been in business for at least three years in 10 different industrial sectors. 
To sum up, most studies to date have focused on the formation of USOs and not their 
subsequent performance, and there is a dearth of studies comparing USOs and CSOs. In the 
next sections we theorize how the contextual background of universities and corporations lead 
to differential access to scientific and market knowledge, potentially shaping the performance 
of both types of spinoffs. 
 
2.2.Knowledge and New Venture Performance 
The  overarching  logic  of  our  argument  suggests  that  the  endowments  of  the  new 
venture team in terms of knowledge, skills, and experience have important implications for 
the future performance of the venture. This appears to be a particularly well suited perspective 
for studying knowledge based entrepreneurship because interest in this area stems from the 
insight  that  individuals  who  holds  certain  knowledge  are  particularly  well  equipped  to 
develop high-potential ventures. Since universities constitute a ‘hub‘ of innovative activities, 
researchers  have  focused  specific  interest  on  the  forces  shaping  the  emergence  of  USOs 
(Vohora et al., 2004; Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). Yet, very little research has discussed the 
relative  benefits  of  corporate  vs.  university  work  experience  for  those  individuals  with  a 
university  education.  We  believe  that  experiences  from  private  corporations  provide  a   9 
potentially  more  valuable  background  to  successfully  commercialize  entrepreneurial 
opportunities than university experience alone. 
The potential for discovering lucrative entrepreneurial opportunities stems from direct 
contact with the market and the knowledge of customer wants, needs, and processes (Cooper, 
Folta and Woo, 1995; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). Von Hippel (1986) also notes that an 
accurate understanding of the most pressing needs of the market is essential to successful 
innovative efforts. A higher level of market knowledge is better for the responsiveness to 
customer  needs  and  the  discovery  of  opportunities.  The  essence  of  discovering  new 
opportunities is to be alert to changes in market demands (Kirzner, 1997). Similarly, increased 
levels of market knowledge allow a firm to have more up-to-date understanding of customer 
problems, an increased ability to determine the potential commercial value of market changes, 
and a superior ability to be able to match offerings to what the customer perceives as valuable 
(Narver and Slater, 1990). Being fully up to date and aware of customer needs will ultimately 
reduce uncertainty and allow firms to save time and effort in efficiently pursuing ways in 
satisfying  customer  wants.  A  firm‘s  ability  to  discover  shifts  in  customer  needs  and 
customers‘ willingness to pay for new things form the basis of opportunity and innovation 
(Kohli, Jaworski and Kumar, 1993).  
To a large extent, market knowledge is tacit in nature. It is difficult to formalize, 
articulate and transfer between organizational contexts (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). In new 
ventures, this knowledge resides with its organizational members and their experiences prior 
to founding (Wennberg, 2009). Prior exposure to and experience of customer relationships is 
essential to the generation of this knowledge. Those who leave employment to start a business 
often benefit from their experiences with their prior employer, or the ―parent‖ organization 
that spawned them (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). Since resources and 
organizational routines transfer from old to new organizations through personnel migration   10 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982, pp.115-121), individual founders‘ experiences may also provide 
strong influences on the new firm‘s performance. 
Individuals  who  gain  experience  from  working  in  a  commercial  context  are  more 
likely to be exposed to the encounters where market knowledge can be gleaned compared to 
those who spend their careers at a university prior to founding a business. Because individuals 
with a university education who spin off their ventures from commercial firms are likely to 
have greater exposure to commercial interaction and thus greater market knowledge, we posit 
that  their  firms  are  likely  to  perform  better  than  those  of  individuals  with  academic 
experiences who spin off their businesses from a university. In support of our argument, one 
recent  study  found  that  spinoff  firms  benefitted  relatively  more  from  prior  non-technical 
experience of the team members at their prior employer, such as marketing (Chatterji, 2009). 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms started by university-educated entrepreneurs as commercial spinoffs 
perform better than firms started by university-educated entrepreneurs as 
university spinoffs in terms of [a] growth in sales revenue, [b] growth in 
employment, and [c] survivability.  
 
 
While market knowledge acquired through prior employment is important, it is by no 
means the only valuable source of knowledge for entrepreneurs with a university education. 
Prior  research  has  established  that  years  of  schooling,  industry  experience  and  prior 
entrepreneurial experience all play important roles in the success of entrepreneurs (in respect 
of USO entrepreneurs, see Mosey and Wright, 2007; Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005).  
Schooling increases the general human capital of the founder (Rauch and Frese, 2005) 
and can be important to the success of the new venture because it facilitates the integration 
and  accumulation  of  new  knowledge.  Further,  higher  education  provides  founders  with  a 
larger opportunity set (Gimeno et al., 1997) and the societal positions facilitated by education   11 
increase the likelihood that advantageously placed individuals will discover entrepreneurial 
opportunities, sometimes by active search and sometimes simply by being in the right place at 
the right time with the right stock of knowledge (Baker et al., 2003). Since schooling leads to 
general  human  capital,  it  provides  founders  with  knowledge,  skills,  and  problem-solving 
abilities that are transferable across many different situations. Prior studies have identified the 
importance of the number of years of education both for new high tech ventures in general 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2005) and for USOs (Colombo et al, 2010b). 
Several studies have provided evidence that spinoffs benefit from the specific learning 
provided by their founders‘ familiarity with the relevant industry in which their new venture 
operates. For example, Koster (2005) surveyed 289 Dutch firms and found that prior industry 
experience provided firm founders with more relevant knowledge, especially with regard to 
product related knowledge. Dahl and Reichsten (2007) followed 323 spinoffs in the Danish 
manufacturing sector from 1980 to 2000 and found that the vitality of the parent company 
combined with industry-specific experience of the spinoff founder positively affected the new 
firm‘s likelihood of survival. Italian studies by Colombo and Grilli (2005) and Colombo et al. 
(2010b) identify the importance of years of industry experience for both new high tech firms 
and USOs.  
It  is  well  established  that  entrepreneurs  largely  learn  through  their  personal 
experiences. The skills  and knowledge relevant to successfully managing and operating a 
business are mainly experiential in nature (Politis, 2005; Starr & Bygrave, 1992). Previous 
entrepreneurial experience provides specific learning that is typically considered important for 
success. Studies of habitual entrepreneurs have highlighted that the experience of operating a 
previous  business  assists  in  the  management  of  subsequent  ones  (Ucbasaran,  Wright,  & 
Westhead,  2003).  Case  study  evidence  from  USO  entrepreneurs  indicates  that  prior   12 
experience of owning a business enables them to learn to build relationships with experienced 
managers and potential equity investors (Mosey and Wright, 2007).  
It would be possible to pose hypotheses for how schooling, industry experience and 
prior  entrepreneurial  experience  influence  entrepreneurial  success.  However,  these 
relationships are well established in the literature and our main focus is on the differences 
between university spinoffs and corporate spinoffs. Therefore, we instead focus our attention 
on the differential effects of these variables between these two types of entrepreneurs. As we 
suggest above, university educated entrepreneurs who start their businesses as commercial 
spinoffs complement their university knowledge with a thorough understanding of the market. 
To  a  large  extent,  those  who  start  university  spinoffs  lack  this  knowledge  (Ensley  and 
Hmieleski,  2005).  Prior  experience  of  the  market  through  industry,  schooling  and 
entrepreneurial experience may then serve to compensate for the lack of market knowledge 
and provide alternative paths to gaining the knowledge needed to successfully start a new 
venture. This suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Firms  started by university-educated entrepreneurs  as  university  spinoffs 
benefit more from the knowledge sources  [a] years of education, [b] years  of 
industry  experience  in  the  same  sector,  and  [c]  years  of  entrepreneurial 
experience,  than  firms  started  by  university-educated  entrepreneurs  as 
commercial spinoffs.  
 
 
2.3.Parent organizational context 
 
In addition to the actual work that the individual entrepreneur performs, the wider 
context  of  the  parent  organization  from  which  the  new  venture  is  spawned  likely  has 
substantial influence on the future destiny of the spinoff  (Burton et al., 2002; Elfenbein et al., 
2010), in relation to both technological knowledge (Malerba and Orsinego, 1993) and other 
knowledge such as marketing know-how (Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009). For example, 
Fairchild is credited with generating a large number of spinoffs mainly in semiconductors   13 
during the early development of Silicon Valley, whereas Stanford University later rose in 
importance  (Klepper,  2001),  now  spinning  off  substantially  different  kinds  of  firms. 
Therefore, a number of distinctive aspects of the university and corporate environments in 
which individuals gain their work experience prior to becoming entrepreneurs are important.  
Spinoffs usually inherit both general technological, organizational, and market-related 
knowledge from their parents (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), suggesting that the technological 
knowledge resulting from exploration activities in universities and corporations and which is 
exploited in the USOs and CSOs is likely to be distinct as the goals and missions of the two 
parent environments are quite different (Clarysse et al., 2010). The focus on highly scientific 
and  engineering  educated  individuals  in  universities  (Hsu  et  al.,  2007)  means  that  the 
technological knowledge in the university context is often novel and provide a broad based 
platform that is important in the market for technology, but it may be a long way from a 
product  that  can  generate  revenues  streams  in  terms  of  sales.  In  contrast,  technological 
knowledge resulting from corporate parents is likely to be narrower and closer to the market. 
An entrepreneur-to-be who works in a corporation dependent on more narrow and ‗market 
ready‘ types of technology is likely to benefit from the exposure to a wide range of different 
technological knowledge bases (Chatterji, 2009). An entrepreneur-to-be in a university setting 
who is exposed to broadly based knowledge and technologies that are further from the market 
is likely to find it more difficult to make the connections between the different technologies. 
We therefore believe that the type of technological knowledge of the parent organization will 
be less important for entrepreneurs who start USOs than for entrepreneurs who start CSOs.  
Further,  the  influence  of  the  parent  organization  does  not  cease  as  the  spinoff  is 
formed. Many entrepreneurs remain in close contact with their former employers and their 
former  colleagues  make  up  an  important  part  of  their  networks  because  of  shared 
technological knowledge (Sapienza et al., 2004). Thus, exposure to the different technologies   14 
of organization and production does not end as the entrepreneur leaves the parent organization 
but can have long lasting effects.  
Organizations with a bureaucratic structure may be inimical to entrepreneurship as 
their checks-and-balances may stifle initiative (Sorensen, 2007). Entrepreneurial individuals 
are likely to be more frustrated by rigid bureaucracies that discourage entrepreneurial actions 
and thus leave to create new ventures (Chatterji, 2009). Large organizations are likely to be 
more  bureaucratic  and  universities  in  particular  are  likely  to  be  more  bureaucratic,  often 
involving  decision-making  by  large  committees  that  meet  infrequently  and  that  are  not 
attuned to commercial demands (Wright et al., 2006),  and a host culture that is generally less 
inclined towards commercial activities than corporations (Colyvas and Powell, 2007; Stuart 
and Ding, 2006). While prior research has revealed large inter-university variation in rates of 
spinoff formation (Lockett and Wright, 2005; Mustar et al., 2006; Di Gregorio and Shane, 
2003), little research has investigated how the organizational characteristics of universities in 
general affect the performance of such spinoffs, conditional on their founding. While large 
universities  may  be  more  likely  to  have  science  and  engineering  departments  generating 
world class knowledge, they are typically organized in a centralized and bureaucratic fashion 
(Thompson, 1965). It is therefore likely that university spinoffs in general will benefit less 
from  the  organizational  characteristics  of  their  parent  university  compared  to  corporate 
spinoffs. Large corporations, on the other hand, especially those with many subsidiaries and 
divisions may have more spawnable activities that are peripheral and difficult to control and 
incentivize yet which may have good underlying performance prospects (Haynes, Thompson 
and Wright, 2003). Being employed in such a large private corporation hence provides more 
fertile opportunities for employees to identify valuable market opportunities (Hellman 2007). 
We  believe  that  once  spun-off  as  independent  entities  with  access  to  finance  and  more 
appropriately  incentivized  founders,  a  background  from  a  large  corporation  with  a  more   15 
extensive set of production and organization technologies enables such spinoffs to be better 
positioned to realize strong growth. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Firms started by university-educated entrepreneurs as commercial spinoffs 
benefit  more  from  the  spawning  environments  of  the  parent  organization  in 
terms of [a] the size of the organization, [b] the set of technologies, and [c] the 
breadth  of  technological  knowledge  in  its  employees,  than  firms  started  by 
university-educated entrepreneurs as university spinoffs 
 
 
3.Data and Methods 
3.1.Research Design and Sample 
Examining and contrasting the performance of CSOs and USOs in a setting that allows 
for generalizable results poses a number of methodological challenges since there might be 
systematic differences between the individuals who start these two kinds of businesses as well 
as between the businesses themselves. First, it is necessary to obtain robust data on both types 
of spinoffs avoiding possible sample selection biases since the performance of spinoff firms 
are likely substantially different at founding compared to later phases of development (West 
& DeCastro, 2001; Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004). Second, there is a risk of systematic 
differences between individuals who pursue the two different entrepreneurial options and such 
risks must be addressed and controlled for to the best extent possible. Third, many of the 
commonly used performance measures (e.g., patenting activity) vary by industry and the entry 
rates into different industries is likely to be different for USOs and CSOs. Therefore, it is 
important  to  rely  on  performance  measures  that  are  robust  across  industries  and  the  two 
modes of entry (Delmar & Shane, 2006). Fourth, in order to avoid selection on the dependent 
variable (performance), we need a sample of firms that can be followed from inception and 
onwards because the lowest performing businesses are likely to exit very early.  
In order to deal with these challenges, we constructed a unique longitudinal dataset, 
combining  data  from  several  different  sources.  First,  we  selected  all  private  incorporated   16 
companies started in Sweden during the period 1994 to 2001 in knowledge-intensive sectors 
(i.e. high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services). The selection of knowledge-
intensive sectors follows Eurostat and OECD's  classification which is based on the R&D 
intensity  being  higher  than  the  mean  of  the  overall  economy  (Götzfried,  2004).  These 
industries comprise about 35% of all firms started in Sweden (Folta et al., 2010) and include 
all  ‗rapidly  growing‘  industries  (chemicals/medicine,  telecom,  finance,  business  services, 
information technology, education and research). A full list of sectors included can be found 
in  Appendix  1.  We  excluded  firms  started  in  other  sectors  and  other  legal  forms  (sole 
proprietorships and partnerships). We did so in order to ensure that we focused on spinoffs 
where founders with a university education utilized their knowledge rather than part-time and 
life-style businesses (Folta et al., 2010) for which entry and exit may be ―a trivial decision‖ 
(Gimeno  et  al.,  1997).  Detailed  information  about  these  firms  was  made  available  to  us 
through  Statistics  Sweden‘s  database  RAMS,  which  contains  annual  data  on  all  firms  in 
Sweden. 
We then added individual founder data taken from the database LISA, which is also 
maintained  by  Statistics  Sweden  and  contains  annual  data  about  all  Swedish  inhabitants, 
including detailed information about education and employment. Given our focus, we limited 
our data to contain all individuals who had completed a university degree lasting at least three 
years in any field and who worked for a university or a private company at least some time 
during the period 1993 to 2001. Among these individuals, we identify those that leave their 
employer  to  start  a  new  incorporated  firm.  We  denote  these  firms  as  USOs  or  CSOs 
depending on whether they transferred into entrepreneurship directly from employment in a 
university or from a private corporation (Zahra et al., 2007). 
The years included in the cohorts of individuals do not fully overlap with the years 
used for constructing the cohorts of firms. The decision to include the cohorts of firms and   17 
individuals that we did was based on three main concerns: (1) the importance of observing the 
pre-entry experience of entrepreneurs in order to theorize how this will shape the development 
of their firms (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002), (2) to sample more than one cohort to avoid time, 
cohort, and period effects, such as the influence of unique economic conditions at founding, 
and  (3)  the  intent  to  follow  the  CSOs  and  USOs  for  several  years  so  that  performance 
differentials may be observed. 
To ensure that the founders indeed were entrepreneurs, we also set the criteria that 
they must hold a majority ownership during the first year and work there full time.
2 In the 
case of team startups,   to ensure that we focused on spinoffs, we further required that a 
majority of the team worked at the same university or corporation prior to the startup 
(Nicolaou and Birley, 2003; Shane, 2004; Lockett et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2004). Through 
LISA we had access to the employment and education history of all individuals back to 1989, 
which allowed us to define and single out USOs and CSOs.   
In total we have eight full cohorts fulfilling the sample criterion of individuals with a 
university education who engage in spinoff entrepreneurship by starting a firm originating 
from  either  a  university  or  corporate  setting  during  the  period  1994  to  2001.  With  these 
definitions, we identified 528 USOs and 8,663 CSOs started during the period 1994 to 2001. 
Thus,  CSOs  constitute  approximately  94%  of  all  spinoffs  in  Sweden.  Concerning  the 
individual entrepreneurs, we have access to their individual life histories dating back to 1989.  
In terms of the firms they start, we have full information from inception up until 2002 or its 
last year of existence if that occurs prior to 2002. For example, if an academic graduates from 
college in 1987, seeks employment in that year and goes on to start a business in 1995 that 
continues its operations in 2002, we would have access to annual education and employment 
data for that individual from 1989 until 2002, and access to annual performance information 
                                                 
2 Our interest is in entrepreneurial spinoffs and not corporate spinoffs. Therefore, building on Klepper‘s (2001) 
definition of these categories, we only include spinoffs where founding individuals maintain controlling rights 
and exclude spinoffs where firms or universities maintain controlling rights..   18 
about the firm from 1995 until 2002. Given that we sample firms between 1994 and 2001 but 
have access to performance data until 2002, surviving firms provide performance data for two 
to nine years, depending on the year of founding. 
 
3.2.Dependent variable: Performance 
We investigate the relative performance of CSOs and USOs. To assess performance we 
rely on three different indicators measured at the level of the spinoff firm. 
Firm Growth:  Growth is commonly considered as the most relevant indicator of performance 
among  new  ventures  (Brush  and  VanderWerf,  1992).  However,  there  is  typically  limited 
correspondence among different indicators of growth, with employment and sales being the 
most common indicators (Shepherd and Wiklund, 2009). We therefore estimated separate 
models for growth in terms of employment and growth in terms of sales. Consistent with prior 
research, we used the formula log(sizet1/sizet0) to compute the respective growth rates (cf. 
Coad, 2010). 
Firm Survival. Disappearance from a data register was not considered a sufficient criterion 
for determining if a firm has failed or continues to survive. In Sweden, by law, any legal 
change to an incorporated firm has to be reported to the authorities and this information is 
passed  on  to  Statistics  Sweden.  Thus,  we  have  information  about  all  kinds  of  firm  exits 
including discontinuance, merger, and acquisition. In particular, exit by merger or acquisition 
need not be a sign of organizational failure. On the contrary, divesting their equity can instead 
be  seen  as  the  peak  of  success  for  many  firm  founders.  We  therefore  believed  that 
discontinued and acquired/merged firms should not be pooled in our survival analysis. Two 
statistical tests based on a discrete choice model of the multinomial logit type were used to 
examine the validity of this belief: We used a log-likelihood ratio test to compare the vectors 
of coefficients of the discontinued and the sold firms (relative to surviving firms). The test   19 
revealed a statistically significant difference between the vectors of coefficients (χ² =84.50, 
d.f.= 28. p < 0.01), indicating that the two alternatives should not be pooled. A Hausman test 
of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives showed that the coefficients for surviving and 
non-surviving firms were not affected by excluding firms that were sold or merged from our 
analysis (χ² =35.15, d.f.= 28. p < 0.34). We therefore eliminated the 8 sold UFOs and 210 sold 
CFOs from our analysis of survival. 
 
3.3.Independent variables 
University/Corporate Spinoff. Our main independent variable pertains to the time-invariant 
dummy  variable  denoting  type  of  spinoff  (USO=1,  CSO=0),  created  according  to  the 
definitions in the ‗Research Design and Sample‘ section above. 
Entrepreneurial experience. We used data from LISA to create the variable entrepreneurial 
experience, measured as the mean number of prior years of entrepreneurial experience in the 
entrepreneurial  team  from  1989  onwards.  The  variable  was  thus  truncated,  although  it  is 
possible that individuals were already involved in entrepreneurship prior to 1989. Truncation 
of independent variables can be problematic since there is a risk of underestimating the effect 
of the variance in the variable at the positive end of the distribution (i.e. we cannot distinguish 
between 10 years and 5 years of experience), increasing the likelihood of type-two errors. 
However, only 4 USOs (1.17%) and 38 CSOs (0.44%) of the sample had five or more years 
of experience, indicating low risk of systematic bias. 
3 
Specific human capital - Industry experience. Following earlier research we measure the 
mean years of prior work experience that the founding team has in the same industry as the 
current venture (SIC-2 digit level) from 1989 onwards (Delmar and Shane, 2006). Hence, this 
variable was also truncated at very high levels.  
                                                 
3 By way of robustness checks we fitted unreported models including a dummy variable for team with 5+ years 
of experience. This slightly decreased effect sizes but significance levels for the models in Tables 3 and 4 were 
still well below 5%., indicating that the results are robust to variable truncation (models available on request).   20 
Education. We measured level of education as the mean number of years in education of the 
founding  team.  This  is  the  most  common  measure  of  general  human  capital  in  the 
entrepreneurship literature and is consistent with previous studies (Colombo & Grilli, 2005). 
The variable was operationalized from education codes in LISA describing the length and 
type of an individual‘s highest education (e.g. 3 years of college, 4-year college, postgraduate 
or PhD).  
Characteristics of the spawning parent organization. We use a number of indicator variables 
to investigate how characteristics of the parent organization influence spinoff survival and 
performance. Our first indicator is organizational size in terms of the Number of Employees. 
Larger organizations may be more bureaucratic but may utilize a larger set of technologies. 
We also included annual Sales as an alternative size measure. However, employee or sales 
size alone does not determine the spawning environments. Organizations with multiple plants 
or establishments are more likely to pursue multiple technologies. Number of Establishments 
was therefore also included. Finally, the type of knowledgeable employees of an organization 
says something about how many technologies it utilizes. We therefore relied on the Number of 
Engineers and Number of PhDs to tap into the overall breadth of technological knowledge of 




Team size. With other founding factors held constant, we would expect spinoffs with larger 
founding  teams  to  be  better  able  to  build  a  market  position  that  allows  them  to  survive 
(Klepper, 2001). We therefore include the variable team size, measuring the total number of 
firm founders. This variable ranges between 1 and 14.   21 
Social capital: Social networks might help entrepreneurial firms overcome the first uncertain 
period and thus facilitate their long-run survival (Mosey and Wright, 2007). To control for the 
effects of social networks to the best extent possible, we include the variable region tenure 
which measures how long a firm founder had lived at one single location since 1989. Since 
tenure in a region has shown to be correlated with an extensive social network, this variable 
approximates, albeit in a coarse manner, for the possibility that a new venture‘s survival is 
positively enhanced by its firm founders‘ social capital (Dahl and Sorenson, 2009). Similar to 
our independent variables, the mean tenure of the team was computed to create a composite 
approximation of the founding teams‘ social network resources. 
Industry affiliation: We control for industry measured at the SIC-3 equivalent level (see 
Appendix 1 for a list of industries). 
 
3.5.Analytical strategy 
To assess firm survival we use event history analysis. We estimated a Cox model 
without the need to make specific assumptions with regard to duration dependence of new 
ventures‘ survival. We used the Cox proportional hazards model since this does necessitate 
any  assumptions  with  regard to  duration dependence,  and allows for flexible  handling of 
curvilinear relations and time-dependent covariates. However, the Cox model assumes that 
there are no tied event times—that is, all events occur in distinct periods. This assumption is 
often violated in large-sample discrete-time data sets. We therefore used the exact partial 
likelihood option (―exactp‖) in STATA to adjust for ties in failure times. 
4 
To assess firm growth in terms of relative change in employees or turnover we used 
panel data regression based on generalized least squares. Because most of our independent 
                                                 
4 Unreported models based on the piecewise and the log-logistic estimation procedures provided qualitatively 
similar results.   22 
variables  are  time-invariant  we  used  random  effects  estimation  in  all  three  models.
5  We 
control for serial correlation in growth rates by including a lagged measure of employee 
growth  or  sales growth.  To test  hypotheses  2  and  3  regarding  the relative benefits  of 
experience for CSOs and USOs, moderator effects are constructed by interacting all predictor 




4.1.Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses 
Descriptive statistics relating to the 528 USOs and 8,663 CSOs are displayed in Table 
1.  As  is  apparent  in  the  table,  these  firms  differ  significantly  both  in  their  parent 
organizational  origin,  the  human  capital  structure  of  the  team,  and  their  subsequent 
performance. The first section of Table 1 entitled ‗Parent Institution Variables‘ highlights that 
the  different  organizational  structure  origins  between  USOs  and  CSOs  in  terms  of 
University/Firm size in employees; size in sales (USD); size in number of establishments; 
University/Firm mean salary; University/Firm # engineers/scientists; and University/Firm # 
PhDs. Specifically, we find that the parent institutions of CSOs are significantly larger than 
those of USOs in terms of employees, sales and number of establishments. In contrast, the 
universities  from  where  USOs  hail  are  –  not  surprisingly  –  characterized  by  a  higher 
accumulation of technical employees than the corporations from which CSOs hail. The parent 
institutions of USOs have significantly more employees who are engineers/scientists and who 
have  PhDs.  These  differences  indicate  that  the  knowledge  structures  of  these  parent 
organizations are quite distinct. 
                                                 
5 To further account for unobserved heterogeneity we also estimated population-averaged models of the type 
generalized estimating equations (GEE), which employ quasi-likelihood estimation in a panel context by looking 
for time-varying deviations from the sample means (Liang and Zeger, 1986). This allows for robust variance 
estimation and controls for serially correlated data for comparison with the main random-effects models. The 
results of the population-averaged models (available upon request) were qualitatively very similar to the random-
effects models, indicating that time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between firms was not a major issue   23 
 
------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE 
------------------------------------ 
 
The second section of Table 1 focuses upon ‗Team human capital variables‘. We find 
that  the  human  capital  within  the  founding  team  differs  substantially  between  USOs  and 
CSOs.  The average USO (CSO) firm team has 15.3(13.8) years of education and 2.0(2.4) 
years  of  industry  experience.  USOs  are  significantly  less  likely  to  have  entrepreneurial 
experience (5.6%) in their founding team compared to CSOs (19.3%). However, USOs are 
significantly more likely to have some prior managerial experiences in the founding team 
(8.86%  vs.  4.62%  for  CSOs).  This  lends  confidence  to  our  view  that  the  human  capital 
resources  of  spinoff  firms  are  systematically  different  between  spinoff  coming  from  a 
university background and spinoffs coming from a corporate background.  
Finally, the third section of Table 1 presents univariate comparisons of the significant 
performance  differences  in  terms  of  survival,  sales  and  employment  between  USOs  and 
CSOs. Specifically, we find a significantly higher survival rate after both two and five years 
for CSOs (78.8% and 61.6%, respectively) than for USOs (72.6% and 53.5%). CSOs are also 
significantly larger after two years than USOs in terms of both sales and employees. The 
mean  organic  sales  growth  of  CSOs  (38.4%)  is  significantly  greater  than  that  of  USOs 
(25.4%). Mean growth rates in employees are negative for both USOs and CSOs but the 
difference between them is not statistically significant. 
The means and standard deviations of all outcome and predictor variables, together 
with the correlation matrix, are displayed in Table 2.  We manually examined the growth 
variables to see if either category (USO or CSO) contained substantial outliers that could   24 
potentially  bias  our  estimations.  A  small  number  of  extraordinary  growth  companies 
(gazelles) could potentially outweigh a large number of moderately growing firms (mice). We 
found  no  evidence  of  such  outliers.  Investigation  of  the  variables  and  their  correlations 
provided no indication of multicollinearity among the predictor variables except for the five 
predictor variables related to the organizational context from which spinoffs are spawned. We 
therefore fitted alternative models where outliers were removed from the data by using a 
Winsoring algorithm (STATA command WINSOR). Results (available upon request) were 
identical  in  directions  and  levels  of  significance,  but  effect  sized  differed  somewhat 




We now move on to test our hypotheses in a multivariate framework. Our dependent 
variable is performance and we use three separate indicators of performance – employment 
growth, sales growth and survival. Table 3 presents random effects GLS models on employee 
growth and sales growth. Table 4 presents exact Cox Regressions on spinoff Survival. In 
order to test Hypothesis 1, in all analyses we enter the time-invariant dummy variable for type 
of spinoff (USO=1, CSO=0) after the introduction of all control variables. In order to test 
Hypotheses  2  and  3,  in  all  analyses  we  distinguish  between  the  effects  of  our  predictor 
variables on CSOs and USOs by interacting each variable with a dummy (USO=1, CSO=0). 
This allows us to conduct chi-2 tests of the difference of the effects of various variables on the 
two  groups  of  firms.  For  brevity  we  display  only  the  GLS  models  including  all  the 
interactions. Nested base models without the USO/CSO dummy or the interaction effect for 
the models predicting employee growth and sales growth were significant (p < 0.001 and p < 
0.01, respectively), explaining 15.5% and 9.5% of variance in employee growth and sales   25 
growth,  respectively.  Adding  the  dummy  variable  for  USO/CSO  to  the  base  model  for 
employment growth improved the R
2 to 16.9%, however the improvement in R
2 value was not 
significant (p > 0.10). Adding the variable to the base model for sales growth improved the R
2 
for that model to 10.8%, representing a significant (p < 0.05) change in R
2 value.  
The dummy variable for CSO/USO shows that CSOs grow more than USOs in terms 
of sales and that the survival probability is higher for CSOs than for USOs. However, there is 
no statistically significant difference in growth in employees between CSOs and USOs. This 
supports Hypothesis 1a and 1c but not 1b, all of which stated that CSOs would outperform 
USOs.  
Next we add the interaction effects as displayed in Tables 3 and 4. The models with 
interaction variables for each predictor and USO/CSO explained 19.8% of the variance in 
employee growth and 13.3% of the variance in sales growth. Both were significant at (p < 
0.001), as was the change in R
2 (p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 relates to how different aspects of 
human capital influences performance differently in the two groups of firms. There is no 
statistically significant difference between the effect of years of education between CSOs and 
USOs for any of the three performance indicators (i.e. growth in employees, and sales, and 
survival.  Thus  we  find  no  support  for  H2a.  We  speculate  that  the  non-significance  of 
education might be due to the fact that our sample only includes people with at least 3 years 
of university education and thus this variable is truncated.  
There is a statistically significantly larger positive effect of industry experience among 
USOs  than  among  CSOs  for  all  three  dependent  variables.  This  supports  Hypothesis  2b, 
stating that firms started by academic entrepreneurs as university spinoffs benefit more from 
the knowledge source years of industry experience in the same sector than firms started by 
CSO entrepreneurs as commercial spinoffs.  However, contrary to our hypothesis we find a 
statistically  significantly  larger  positive  effect  of  entrepreneurial  experience  among  CSOs    26 
than among USOs across all three dependent variables. This leads us to reject Hypothesis 2c 
in  that  firms  started  by  academic  entrepreneurs  as  USOs  do  not  benefit  more  from  the 
knowledge provided by prior entrepreneurial experience in the same sector than firms started 
by academic entrepreneur as CSOs.  
Our  Hypothesis  3  states  that  CSOs  benefit  more  from  the  characteristics  of  the 
spawning organizations than do USOs. We relied on five separate proxies to characterize the 
spawning  organization.    For  three  of  these  indicators,  we  found  a  statistically  significant 
larger positive effect among CSOs than among USOs across all three performance indicators 
(number  of  employees;  revenues;  number  of  establishments),  providing  support  for 
hypotheses  3a  and  3b.  The  number  of  engineers  in  the  parent  firm  had  a  statistically 
significantly larger positive influence on the two growth variables but not on survival. Finally, 
we found no statistically significant differences pertaining to the influence of number of PhDs 
for any of the dependent variables. There is thus mixed support for hypothesis 3c. In sum, we 
conduct 15 tests of Hypothesis 3 and find strong support for 11 and weak support for 2 of 
them, leading to the conclusion that overall, Hypothesis 3 is supported by our analyses.  
Table  5  summarizes  our  hypotheses  and  results.  Most  hypotheses  receive  support 
across two or all three performance indicators. Only two hypotheses receive no support, i.e., 
the influence of years of education and entrepreneurial experience. All in all, 18 of our 28 
theoretical predictions of performance differentials between USOs and CSOs received strong 
or moderate empirical support, speaking to the general validity of our findings.  
 
------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLES 3, 4 AND 5 HERE 
------------------------------------ 
   27 
4.3 Robustness checks: sector analyses 
Observed  performance  differences  between  USOs  and  CSOs  may  differ  across 
industries. Accordingly, we extend our study by disaggregating the analysis on firm growth 
by  industry  sectors
6.  Appendix  1  shows  that  some  sectors  contain  very  few  USOs. 
Accordingly, we first estimate models for sectors where both USOs and CSOs are prevalent, 
i.e., (1) Computers and software, (2) Finance/auditing, and (3) Management consulting and 
other consulting, shown in Table A in Appendix 2. Further, Table B in Appendix 2 shows 
models for the two sectors where CSOs were overrepresented (Construction / engineering and 
real estate) and Table C in Appendix 2 shows models for the two sectors where USOs are 
overrepresented (Education and Research and Development). The first sub-sector analyses in 
Table A show that overall, the findings in our overall models are robust to sub -sector 
differences. While the findings for the spawning environment of the parent organization had 
less impact on the performance of CSOs in terms of sales growth in the Finance/auditing and 
Computers/software sectors, our findings for employee growth were iden tical in all three 
sector analyses, as were the findings for the USO dummy and founding teams‘ human capital. 
Hence, our findings are apparent in all of the largest sectors. Table B in Appendix 2 shows 
that  these  findings  are  also  similar  in  the  sectors  where  CSOs  were  overrepresented 
(Construction/engineering and real estate) but significance levels for USOs are weak as a 
result of the small sample size (n=25). Finally, Table C in Appendix 2 shows that in the two 
sectors where USOs are overrepresented (Education and Research and Development), our 
results are similar but significance levels are low for both groups, likely because of the small 
sample sizes (56 USOs and 96 CSOs). In sum, we find that our results are fairly robust across 
industrial sectors. While the effects of some of the proxies for the spawning environment are 
                                                 
6 We display robustness models for all sectors based on (log)growth in employees and (log)growth in sales 
rather than firm survival for (i) sake of brevity and (ii) firm growth is generally considered a more relevant 
performance measure for policy makers.   28 
not statistically significant, other findings remain essentially unchanged. In the next section 
we discuss the implications of our research for theory and public policy. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
This  paper  compared  the  effects  of  direct  and  indirect  spillovers  of  university 
knowledge on the performance of spinoff ventures. Utilizing a unique longitudinal dataset 
including  the  whole  population  of  spinoffs  in  Sweden,  we  compared  and  contrasted  two 
distinct spinoff routes where the founders have had a university education; spinoff firms that 
emerge directly from universities (USOs) and firms that are spun out by university-educated 
founders from a commercial setting (CSOs).  
A first interesting observation is that we observed 528 spinoffs from universities and 
8,663 corporate spinoffs for a period of close to a decade. In other words, the direct path to 
knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship via university spinoffs seems to represent only a small 
minority of cases. The indirect path via corporate spinoffs is much more common. We believe 
that this observation has some interesting implications. First, it seems that the traditional role 
of  universities  as  producers  of  knowledgeable  employees  might  be  an  appropriate  one. 
Universities do educate individuals who eventually become entrepreneurs, but it is far more 
common  that  these  individuals  enter  entrepreneurship  from  employment  in  the  corporate 
setting rather than directly from their university employment. Second, given that our results 
indicate that CSOs perform better than USOs in terms of survival as well as growth, this 
seems to be an effective model for achieving knowledge-intensive entrepreneurship. Third, 
the vast outnumbering of CSOs compared to USOs in combination with the performance 
advantages  of  CSOs  calls  into  question  the  dominance  of  public  policy  singling  out  and 
supporting USOs. Moreover, Sweden is a country where IP arising from university research is 
vested with the inventor and can be transferred into the USOs that they start. This is different   29 
from CSOs, where the default is that IP remains the property of the employer. This should 
potentially  lead  to  performance  advantages  of  USOs.    Our  results,  however,  indicate  the 
opposite.  It  seems  that  other  advantages  of  working  in  a  commercial  firm  rather  than  a 
university prior to startup outweigh this potential disadvantage of not owning the IP generated 
in the workplace. This is not to say that vesting IP arising from university research with the 
inventor is a failed policy. We do not know what the implications would have been if the IP 
were to have remained the property of the universities. USOs might have had even more of a 
performance disadvantage under such circumstances.  
We developed a series of hypotheses addressing how knowledge endowments would 
differentially influence USOs and CSOs. To a large extent, these hypotheses were supported 
by  our  analyses.  Generally,  CSOs  had  more  substantial  endowments  of  important  human 
capital  such  as  entrepreneurial  experience,  but  some  human  capital  endowments  such  as 
industry experience mattered more for USOs than for CSOs. These findings suggest that it is 
important  for  USOs  to  include  in  their  founding  teams  individuals  who  hold  relevant 
experiences outside of the university, but that relatively few teams do so. It is possible that 
university employees lack the contacts to identify such individuals and recruit them to their 
teams (Rasmussen et al., 2011). Making connections with such experienced individuals could 
be an important task for public policy such as for TTOs, but these too may need to augment 
their own recruitment to be able to undertake this task (Siegel et al., 2007). 
We also hypothesized and found that the nature of the parent organization mattered 
more  for  CSOs  than  for  USOs.  We  found  that  our  proxies  for  the  size  and  knowledge 
endowments of parent organizations‘ significantly raises the performance of CSOs but had 
little effect on the performance of USOs. People spinning out their firms from the corporate 
environment  benefitted  from  working  at  large  firms  with  multiple  establishments.  This 
extends  prior  research  on  how  parent  organization  characteristics  shape  the  evolution  of   30 
spinoff  firms  which  has  tended  to  find  that  smaller  parent  organization  foster  spinoff 
formation  (Elfenbein  et  al.,  2010;  Sorensen,  2007)  by  noting  that  such  patterns  are 
systematically  different  depending  on  the  institutional  environment  of  the  parent 
organizations. While we know that some universities are more likely to generate spinoffs than 
others (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003), our paper is – to the best of our knowledge – the first 
to highlight such systematic differences between universities and corporations. Our findings 
indicate that at least in Sweden, large firms provide a more lucrative seed bed for high-growth 
spinoffs than do small firms. From a supply-side perspective (Thornton, 1999), these findings 
signal that these entrepreneurs are exposed to a wider set of different knowledge bases during 
their employment and can draw on a more diverse set of contacts in their networks post start-
up. A complementary interpretation from a demand-side perspective is that the opportunity 
costs for USO and CSO founders may differ. In the US, university scientists may have high 
opportunity costs since if they leave it may be difficult to get back into universities as there 
may be a gap in their publications record (Lacetera, 2009). In Sweden, this may be less of a 
problem since as it is easier to obtain leave of absence. Consequently, the opportunity cost of 
becoming  a  USO  founder  may  be  lower.  As  such,  USO  founders  may  engage  in  riskier 
ventures with high failure likelihood and lower growth prospects.  
5.1 Implications for Policy and Research 
Our  research  addresses  knowledge  spillover  from  universities  and  we  examined 
entrepreneurship  as  a  mechanism  for  direct  knowledge  spillover  via  university  spinoffs 
compared to indirect spillovers via corporate spinoffs started by individuals with a university 
background. Of course, knowledge spills over from universities through other mechanisms as 
well. Figure 1 contrasts direct and indirect spillover on the vertical axis and entrepreneurship 
vs.  other  mechanisms  on  the  horizontal  axis.  This  gives  us  a  2*2  matrix  exhibiting  four 
typified university knowledge spillover mechanisms. Currently, there is interest in and focus   31 
on academic entrepreneurship through university spinoffs (quadrant 1) in scholarly work as 
well as in the policy debate. We believe that we contribute to this debate by offering a wider 
approach adding the indirect mechanism of corporate spinoffs (quadrant 2). This opens up a 
wider policy debate on how knowledge spills over from universities. Our research does not at 
all touch upon quadrants 3 and 4 in the bottom half of Figure 1. We take this opportunity, 
however, to note that research and policy on academic entrepreneurship also consider these 
non-entrepreneurial mechanisms for knowledge spillover. In order to appropriately assess the 
effectiveness of policies aimed at facilitating academic entrepreneurship, comparisons along 
the  horizontal  as  well  as  vertical  axes  of  Figure  1  are  needed.  To  date,  it  appears  that 
academic  entrepreneurship  has  been  examined  in  relative  isolation  from  these  alternative 
ways of generating knowledge spillover. We strongly encourage future studies and policies to 
consider these alternative mechanisms. 
 
------------------------------------ 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
------------------------------------ 
 
Our  study  provides  implications  for  intellectual  property  policy  and  university 
research commercialization in that the findings indicate a need to take a broader view of the 
knowledge  and  intellectual  property  emerging  from  universities  that  is  transferred  into 
entrepreneurship. Specifically, our finding of the importance of commercial experience in 
addition to scientific knowledge in fuelling the growth and survival of spinoff ventures speaks 
to concerns that while there may have been an increase in the number of USOs, many of them 
fail. This suggests an important imperative to assist USOs in building viable teams that have 
the requisite commercial experience to succeed. Various studies have questioned the extent to   32 
which and indeed whether TTOs have the expertise to build these kinds of teams (Kenney and 
Patton, 2009; Siegel et al., 2007).    
More generally, our analysis also  goes beyond the more specific debate about the 
consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act to the policy debate on how knowledge spills over from 
established organizations into new organizations (Acs et al., 2009; Agarwal et al., 2007). Our 
findings suggest there may need to be attention to policy support to facilitate spinning out 
from established organizations, particularly where employees seek to exploit ideas, skills or 
customer relationships that parent organizations see as peripheral. An obvious potential policy 
variable to consider is non-compete covenants (Folta et al., 2010; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). 
Such covenants are asymmetrically applicable to individuals with high human capital, which 
are  the  ones  we  find  most  likely  to  build  prosperous  CSOs.  Further,  policy  makers  may 
consider ―softer policies‖ such as the promotion of role models that left existing organizations 
to start spinoffs (Cooper et al., 1995; Sørensen, 2007). 
If  knowledge-based  entrepreneurship  constitutes  an  important  vehicle  for  realizing 
economic  growth,  then  an  exclusive  policy  focus  on  the  direct  start-up  of  ventures  by 
academics  employed  in  universities  might  be  premature.  Our  results  indicate  that  since 
realizing growth among knowledge-intensive firms involves general problems that apply to 
the whole population of spinoffs studied, it might be important to develop targeted policy 
favoring  the  establishment  of  growth-oriented  entrepreneurship  in  general,  so  as  not  to 
exclude the important group of CSOs in favor of USOs. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
As all papers, our study has a number of limitations that provide avenues for further 
research. First, the advantage of a ―clean test‖ comparing the performance of USOs and CSOs 
in a small industrial nation with comprehensive publicly available data is also a limitation   33 
since by research design we exclude variation in institutionally oriented boundary conditions 
as  these  are  primarily  found  to  reside  in  cross-national  variation  in  institutions  such  as 
taxation rates, intellectual property protection (Autio and Acs, 2010). Specifically, we note 
that at the time of the study, Sweden was experiencing a period when ownership of university 
IP was vested with the academic. Further research might usefully examine contexts where IP 
ownership  is  with  the  university  or  other  stakeholders.  Moreover,  care  must  be  taken  in 
generalizing  these  results  to  other  countries  with  different  institutional  and  economic 
conditions.  Second,  while  we  could  observe  apparent  performance  differentials  between 
USOs  and  CSOs  both  in  terms  of  survival  and  in  terms  of  growth  during  the  period  of 
observation,  eight  years  might  not  be  long  enough  for  an  examination  of  the  small  but 
important sub-group of firms with long time to market, such as biotech firms (Stam  and 
Wennberg,  2009).  Third,  while  we  make  important  headway  in  research  studying  the 
workplace and employment backgrounds of academic entrepreneurs (Sørensen, 2007) we do 
not  directly  control  for  the  potential  of  negative  selection  into  entrepreneurship  (Parker, 
2009). If the share of entrepreneurial individuals in the economy is relatively constant over 
time (Baumol, 1990), then there is the possibility that a relatively larger share of risk-averse 
individuals  people  will  decide  to  work  in  incumbent  firms  rather  than  establishing 
independent new firms. In Sweden there is a strong tradition of large industrial companies 
producing most R&D and innovation (Granstrand and Alänge, 1995). In other words, it may 
be that the Swedish industrial structure provides academics with employment in international 
firms  with  a  strong  internal  labor  market  and  the  possibility  to  engage  in  corporate 
entrepreneurship, with the result that only entrepreneurs with human capital not adapted to 
these firms will choose to spin off and create CSOs. More research on the origin, structure, 
and relative merits of USOs and CSOs is needed, especially since several policy measures to   34 
support entrepreneurship among academic entrepreneurs (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2001) 
were initiated during the period of investigation.  
Fourth, we defined USOs and CSOs to involve cases where the entrepreneurs work 
full time in the business, excluding part-time firms to better facilitate comparison between the 
two types of spinoffs. Academics starting businesses in particular may be likely to retain full-
time employment at their university (Nicolaou and Birley, 2003) and inclusion of such part-
time firms could raise the number of USOs. Further research might seek to undertake a more 
fine-grained analysis of the primary and secondary job positions of  spinoff entrepreneurs. 
Fifth,  our  lack  of  findings  in  relation  to  education  may  be  affected  by  the  truncated 
distribution that arises from our definition of university educated entrepreneurs having to have 
at least three years education. Sixth, the academic entrepreneurship literature has noted the 
importance of the role of elite universities compared with so-called mid-range universities 
(Shane, 2004; Wright et al., 2008b). Our analysis did not control for elite universities since in 
the Swedish context there is little qualitative difference between universities.  
Finally, given the focus of this special issue, our study has concentrated on the direct 
and indirect spillover of knowledge from universities through USOs and CSOs in order to 
obtain insights into the impact of the university on society. The entrepreneurial spawning 
literature  (Agarwal  et al., 2004;  Chatterji,  2009) has  examined the impact of the type of 
knowledge transferred to spinoffs from the parents and has compared the performance of 
these firms with new entrants that have not been spawned from a larger organization. Further 
research might usefully extend analysis in this area to compare the performance of CSOs 
founded by entrepreneurs with and without university education with USOs and non-spinoffs.  
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 Table 1: Descriptives of USOs and ASOs 
  Academic 
Spinoffs 
Corporate Spinoffs  Test of significance 
N:  528  8,663   
Parent Organization Variables       
ln(University/Firm employees)       2939  3717  T: 2.55, P > 0.01 
ln(University/Firm sales)  7 733 378 (USD)  78 666 666 (USD)  T: 4.97, P > 0.001 
University/Firm establishments  26.04  93.08  T: 8.55, P > 0.001 
ln(Engineers and scientists in 
University/Firm)  965.27  277.62  T: -21.31, P > 0.001 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  757.77  40.195  T: -110.10, P > 
0.001 
       
Team Human Capital Variables       
Mean Years of education in team         15.32  13.82  T: -29.76, P > 0.001 
Mean Industry experience in team       0.200  0.240  T: 6.41, P > 0.001 
Management Experience (2/1/0)       8.86%  4.62%  T: -4.39, P > 0.001 
Mean Entrepreneurial experience in 
team    5.58%  19.32%  T: 6.08, P > 0.001 
Team size  2.45  3.03  T: 4.41, P > 0.001 
       
Outcome variables       
DV1: Firm Survival   72.56% 
 (after 2 years) 
78.79%  
 (after 2 years)  Chi-2 (Wilcoxon)  
5.13, P > 0.05  Firm Survival after 2 years  53.47% 
 (after 5 years) 
61.58%  
 (after 5 years) 
DV2: ln(employee growth)  0.07  0.09  T: 0.70, P > 0.240 
Mean Employees after 2 years  3.66  4.59  T: 1.88, P > 0.05 
DV3: ln(Sales growth)  0.17  0.26  T: 4.08, P > 0.001 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
1  Firm death                             
2  USO=1  0.008                           
3  ln(employee growth)  -0.077  0.016                         
4  ln(sales growth)  -0.033  0.005  0.231                       
5  ln(University/Firm employees)       0.006  0.216  0.040  0.016                     
6  ln(University/Firm sales)  0.014  -0.163  0.045  0.040  0.303                   
7  University/Firm establishments  -0.011  0.124  0.008  -0.006  0.810  0.246                 
8  ln(Engineers scientists in 
University/Firm) 
-0.003  0.309  0.038  0.016  0.828  0.202  0.672               
9  ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  0.000  0.528  0.025  0.012  0.701  0.073  0.601  0.845             
10  Team years education in (mean)        -0.006  0.151  0.014  0.002  0.079  0.000  0.067  0.203  0.217           
11  Team entrepreneurial exp. (mean)   -0.004  -0.015  0.027  0.015  -0.147  0.038  -0.084  -0.098  -0.062  0.039         
12  Team industry experience in (mean)  -0.013  -0.049  0.053  0.032  -0.059  -0.273  -0.026  -0.060  -0.062  0.036  -0.066       
13  Team Management Exp. (2/1/0)       -0.004  0.004  0.015  0.013  -0.014  -0.060  -0.003  0.003  0.005  0.055  0.062  0.068     
14  Team size  -0.027  -0.017  0.016  0.020  0.019  0.128  -0.049  -0.041  -0.041  -0.017  0.014  -0.219  -0.059   
15  Mean Social Capital in team        -0.023  -0.007  0.004  0.007  0.009  0.261  0.040  0.004  0.002  0.015  0.108  -0.215  -0.010  0.152   44 
Table 3: Panel Regressions on ln(Sales Growth) and ln(Employee Growth) 
 
  DV: ln(Employee Growth)  DV: ln(Sales Growth) 
Variables  USOs  CSOs 
Significant 
difference  USOs  CSOs 
Significant 
difference 
Growth at t-1  0.044  0.038***    0.006  0.164***   
  (0.040)  (0.006)    (0.056)  (0.010)   
ln(University/Firm employees)      -0.015  0.008***  P > 0.001  -0.019  0.004+  P > 0.07 
H3:  (0.017)  (0.002)  supported  (0.021)  (0.002)  weakly 
supported 
ln(University/Firm sales)  -0.004  0.001**  P > 0.05  -0.006  0.001**  P > 0.001 
H3:  (0.003)  (0.000)  supported  (0.006)  (0.000)  supported 
University/Firm establishments  -0.005  0.010***  P > 0.001  -0.038  0.010***  P > 0.001 
H3:  (0.015)  (0.002)  supported  (0.020)  (0.003)  supported 
ln(Engineers/scientists in 
University/Firm)  0.008  0.005*  P > 0.05  0.006  0.003*  P > 0.05 
H3:  (0.015)  (0.002)  supported  (0.016)  (0.001)  supported 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  0.006  0.003  P > 0.54  0.002  0.005  P > 0.71 
H3:  (0.008)  (0.003)  not 
supported  (0.010)  (0.004)  not 
supported 
Mean Years of education in team         0.004*  0.003**  P > 0.43  0.007*  0.003*  P > 0.54 
H2a:  (0.002)  (0.001)  not 
supported  (0.004)  (0.001)  not 
supported 
Mean Industry experience in 
team         0.020**  0.014+  P < 0.01  0.033**  0.012**  P < 0.06 
H2a:  (0.001)  (0.001)  supported  (0.002)  (0.003)  weakly 
supported 
Mean Entrepreneurial experience 
in team     0.005*  0.011***  P > 0.10  0.023  0.008*  P > 0.10 
H2b:  (0.002)  (0.002)  not 
supported  (0.015)  (0.003)   not 
supported 
Management Experience (2/1/0)        0.036  0.008    0.002  0.014   
  (0.034)  (0.005)    (0.008)  (0.003)   
Team size  0.004*  0.003***    0.001  0.001   
  (0.002)  (0.000)    (0.005)  (0.001)   
Mean Social Capital in team     0.006*  0.002**    -0.001  0.003*   
  (0.003)  (0.001)    (0.005)  (0.001)   
USO dummy (in pooled model)  -0.004    -0.013***   
H1a:  (0.003)  H1b:  (0.001)   
         
R2 (within)   0.096     0.065   
R2 (between)   0.246     0.234   
R2 (overall)   0.198     0.133   
Firm-year Obs.  2.670  38.034    2.670  38.034   
Unique firms:  528  8663    528  8663   
Wald chi2(42)   2696.42***     3097.88***   
 
Note: Both models estimated with random effects Generalized Least Squares. 
Standard errors clustered by firms in parenthesis. Industry dummies included 
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Table 4: Exact Cox Regressions on Spinoff Survival 
   
Variables  USOs  CSOs 
Significant difference 
between predictors on 
USOs and CSOs (Chi2) 
ln(employee growth)  0.547  0.405***   
  (0.209)  (0.032)   
ln(sales growth)  0.933  0.836***   
  (0.248)  (0.039)   
ln(University/Firm 
employees)       1.000  0.991**  P < 0.001 
H3  (0.000)  (0.000)  supported 
ln(University/Firm sales)  1.000  0.993*  P < 0.05 
H3  (0.000)  (0.000)  supported 
University/Firm 
establishments  0.992  0.980**  P < 0.05 
H3  (0.012)  (0.000)  supported 
ln(Engineers/scientists in 
University/Firm)  1.001  1.000  P < 0.07 
H3  (0.000)  (0.000)  weakly supported 
ln(PhD:s in 
University/Firm)  1.002*  1.000  P < 0.05 
H3  (0.001)  (0.000)  supported 
Mean Years of education 
in team          1.026  0.992  P > 0.69 
H2a  (0.015)  (0.010)  not supported 
Mean Industry experience 
in team        0.959*  0.587***  P < 0.001 
H2b  (0.081)  (0.016)  supported 
Mean Entrepreneurial 
experience in team    1.007  0.990**  P > 0.10 
H2c  (0.163)  (0.000)  not supported 
Management Experience 
(2/1/0)       0.353  0.988   
  (0.244)  (0.062)   
Mean Social Capital in 
team    0.983  0.960***   
  (0.033)  (0.006)   
Team size  0.921  0.969***   
  (0.046)  (0.005)   
USO=1 (pooled model)  1.15***   
H1a:  (0.034)   
Log-likelihood:  -32349.281   
Firm-year Obs.  2,654  37,563   
Unique firms:  520  8,453   
Failures:  352  3,372   
 
Note: Coefficients in Hazard rate format, no constant estimated. Exact 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry dummies included but not displayed. 
 * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.  (two-tailed).    46 
Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses and findings 
 
 
    Performance indicator 
Hypothesis:    Survival  Employee 
Growth  Sales Growth 
H1:  Dummy for USO/CSO  supported 
(P < 0.001) 
not supported 
(P > 0.51) 
supported 
(P < 0.001) 
H2: 
 
Mean  Years  of  education  in 
team                    
not supported 
 (P > 0.69) 
not supported 
 (P > 0.43) 
not supported 
 (P > 0.54) 
Mean  Industry  experience  in 
team                  
supported 
 (P < 0.001) 
supported 
 (P < 0.01) 
weakly 
supported 
 (P < 0.06) 
Mean Entrepreneurial 
experience in team       Reversed  Reversed  Reversed 
H3: 
 
ln(University/Firm employees)              supported 
 (P < 0.001) 
supported 
 (P < 0.001) 
weakly 
supported 
 (P < 0.07) 
ln(University/Firm sales)  supported 
 (P < 0.05) 
supported 
 (P < 0.05) 
supported 




 (P < 0.05) 
supported 
 (P < 0.001) 
supported 





 (P < 0.07) 
supported 
 (P < 0.05) 
supported 
 (P < 0.05) 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  supported 
 (P < 0.05) 
not supported 
 (P > 0.54) 
not supported 
 (P > 0.71) 
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Appendix 1: Industry of spinoffs 
 
Industry of spinoffs  Academic 
Spinoffs 
Corporate Spinoffs 
Chemicals and fiber manufacturing  0.30%  0.19% 
Electrical and optical equipment  2.37%  3.42% 
Transport equipment  0.30%  0.12% 
Networks, radio and TV  2.96%  2.27% 
Finance  4.44%  4.65% 
Real estate business  3.10%  12.07% 
Computers/software  19.53%  16.25% 
Research and Development  11.54%  1.18% 
Accounting / auditing  3.25%  6.16% 
Construction / engineering  5.03%  11.09% 
Advertising  3.25%  7.78% 
Management consulting  19.53%  14.30% 
Law firms  1.18%  5.03% 
Other consulting services  3.25%  6.82% 
Education  13.30%  0.02% 
Institutions (elderly/children/care)  0.30%  1.64% 
Private Health care  4.14%  5.14% 
News and entertainment  2.03%  1.86% 
 
 
Note: These industries correspond to the OECD classification of knowledge-intensive industries, which is based 
on the R&D intensity being higher than the mean of the overall economy (Götzfried, 2004). At first glance, some 
industries may appear less knowledge intensive. In unreported regressions we therefore excluded certain 
industries (e.g., private health care) to test if results were sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of certain 
industries. The results were virtually identical. Moreover we also conducted extensive robustness checks with 
industry specific analyses for the larger sectors, as reported in Appendices 2 and 3. These analyses confirmed 
that our results were robust. Finally, we note that in-depth industry analyses have shown that the 
Construction/Engineering (Reichstein et al, 2005) and Finance and Advertising (Wennberg, 2009) industries 
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Appendix 2: Sub-sector analyses 
 
Table A: Robustness analyses for (1) Computers and software, (2) Finance/auditing, (3) Management consulting / other consulting 
 
Dependent variable:  ln(employee growth)   ln(sales Growth)   ln(employee growth)   ln(sales growth)   ln(employee growth)   ln(sales growth)  
sector:  Computers / software  Computers/ software  Finance/auditing  Finance/auditing  Consulting  Consulting 
Variables  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs 
Growth at t-1  0.140  0.101***  0.014  0.173**  0.025  0.025  0.103  0.209**  -0.159*  -0.043*  -0.187  0.021 
  (0.112)  (0.020)  (0.003)  (0.037)  (0.076)  (0.014)  (0.173)  (0.020)  (0.069)  (0.017)  (0.377)  (0.034) 
ln(University/Firm employees)      -0.140  0.014**  0.036  0.009  0.071  0.005*  0.139  0.003  0.004  0.034  -0.210  0.002 
  (0.112)  (0.005)  (0.163)  (0.009)  (0.056)  (0.001)  (0.100)  (0.007)  (0.025)  (0.005)  (0.434)  (0.009) 
ln(University/Firm sales)  0.000  0.117***  0.038  0.002  -0.010  0.003*  -0.011  0.002*  -0.006  0.001  0.071  0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.035)  (0.044)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.276)  (0.001) 
University/Firm establishments  0.005  0.003*  -0.012  0.003*  -0.060  0.019**   -0.131  0.012*  -0.015  0.013*  0.539  0.012* 
  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.034)  (0.005)  (0.057)  (0.006)  (0.027)  (0.005)  (0.784)  (0.004) 
ln(Engineers/scientists in 
University/Firm) 
-0.019  -0.005  0.141  0.068*  -0.039  0.004  0.001  0.004*  -0.035  0.016*  -0.304  0.005 
(0.030)  (0.007)  (0.056)  (0.032)  (0.065)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.007)  (1.263)  (0.015) 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  0.051*  -0.016  0.060  0.006  -0.029  0.002  -0.119  0.004  0.027  0.011  -0.030  -0.020 
  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.016)  (0.057)  (0.007)  (0.099)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.031)  (0.022) 
Mean Years of education in team         0.036*  -0.004  0.010  0.008  0.008  0.001  0.005  -0.002  0.004  0.007*  0.040  0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.027)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.054)  (0.004) 
Mean Industry experience in team         0.012*  0.006+  0.015*  0.008+  0.022**  0.022  0.914**   0.011*  0.018*  0.011  0.095*  0.007 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.280)  (0.363)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.004)  (0.038)  (0.007) 
Mean Entrepreneurial exp. in team    (0.001)  0.010  0.022  0.018*  0.102  0.022*  0.273**  0.023*  0.047  0.015  0.028*  0.049* 
  -0.000  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.009)  (0.061)  (0.004)  (0.079)  (0.011)  (0.062)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.023) 
USO dummy (in pooled model)   -0.010  -0.010**   -0.002   -0.008**   -0.005   -0.043** 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.011) 
             
R2 (within)  0.102  0.097  0.082  0.053  0.110  0.102 
R2 (between)  0.164  0.136  0.153  0.267  0.197  0.246 
R2 (overall)  0.132  0.155  0.123  0.123  0.143  0.198 
Firm-year Obs.  336  3,396  336  3,396  119  7,810  119  7,810  513  6,028  513  6,028 
Unique firms:  127  866  127  866  37  1,947  37  1,947  164  1,535  164  1,535 
Wald chi2(42)  186.69***  68.44***  605.31***  951.15***  1426.21***  696.42*** 
 
Note: All models estimated with random effects Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors clustered by firms in parentheses. Industry dummies and controls 
for Management Experience, Team size and team Social Capital included but not displayed.  + p <.10 * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001.  (two-tailed).    49 
Table B: Robustness analyses for (1) Construction / engineering, (2) real estate  
 
Dependent variable:  ln(employee growth)   ln(sales Growth)   ln(employee growth)   ln(sales growth) 
sector:  Construction / engineering  Construction / engineering  Real estate  Real estate 
Variables  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs 
Growth at t-1  0.013  0.015  0.051  0.214***  0.224*  0.094***  0.059*  0.091*** 
  (0.079)  (0.019)  (0.119)  (0.033)  (0.085)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.020) 
ln(University/Firm employees)      -0.022  0.005  0.007  0.025***  -0.007  0.070***  0.118  0.013* 
  (0.047)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.113)  (0.006) 
ln(University/Firm sales)  0.001  0.031**  -0.047  0.002**  0.000  0.001*  0.002  0.003** 
  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.070)  (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.001)  (0.107)  (0.001) 
University/Firm establishments  -0.048  0.010*  -0.006  0.010  0.005  0.010*  -0.022  0.006 
  (0.039)  (0.004)  (0.051)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.061)  (0.007) 
ln(Engineers/scientists in 
University/Firm) 
0.013  0.006*  0.046  -0.007  0.005  0.006  -0.040  0.001 
(0.046)  (0.002)  (0.073)  (0.009)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.009) 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  0.006  -0.004  0.018  0.003  0.004  0.018  -0.002  0.010 
  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
Mean Years of education in team         0.003  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.007  0.004  0.100  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.056)  (0.004) 
Mean Industry experience in team         0.010*  0.003  0.006*  0.009   0.021+  0.007   0.020+  0.014 
  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Mean Entrepreneurial exp.in team     0.103  0.003  0.028  0.034  0.006  0.009**  0.004+  0.052* 
  (0.048)  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.020) 
USO dummy (in pooled model)   -0.003   -0.054**    -0.012   -0.021** 
  (0.002)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
         
R2 (within)  0.112  0.081  0.078  0.090 
R2 (between)  0.123  0.367  0.226  0.219 
R2 (overall)  0.163  0.218  0.140  0.162 
Firm-year Obs.  163  4120  163  4120  109  4311  109  4311 
Unique firms:  41  946  41  946  25  918  25  918 
Wald chi2(42)  98.83***  56.69***  523.12***  53.10*** 
 
Note: All models estimated with random effects Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors clustered by firms in parenthesis. Industry 
dummies and controls for Management Experience, Team size and team Social Capital included but not displayed.  + p <.10 * p <.05, 
 ** p <.01, *** p <.001.  (two-tailed).    50 




































Note: All models estimated with random effects Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors clustered by firms in parenthesis. Industry 
dummies and controls for Management Experience, Team size and team Social Capital included but not displayed.  + p <.10 * p <.05, ** 
p <.01, *** p <.001.  (two-tailed).  
Dependent variable:  ln(employee growth)  ln(sales Growth)  ln(employee growth)  ln(sales growth)  
sector:  Education  Education  R&D  R&D 
Variables  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs  USOs  CSOs 
Growth at t-1  0.372  0.125***  0.109  0.131***  0.012  0.020  0.404**  0.308* 
  (0.245)  (0.022)  (0.078)  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.106)  (0.092)  (0.148) 
ln(University/Firm employees)      -0.032  0.012*  0.019  0.014*  0.026  0.067*  0.030  0.110* 
  (0.282)  (0.006)  (0.035)  (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.032)  (0.029) 
ln(University/Firm sales)  0.020  -0.001  -0.003  0.007*  -0.001  0.043  0.000  0.005+ 
  (0.021)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.065)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
University/Firm establishments  0.071  0.018*  0.012  0.003  -0.044  0.050*  -0.047  0.020 
  (0.179)  (0.008)  (0.027)  (0.007)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.036)  (0.098) 
ln(Engineers/scientists in 
University/Firm) 
0.142  0.010*  -0.035  0.005  -0.001  0.028+  0.001  0.039 
(0.509)  (0.004)  (0.034)  (0.007)  (0.033)  (0.016)  (0.045)  (0.051) 
ln(PhD:s in University/Firm)  -0.136  0.002  -0.004  0.008  0.001  0.031  -0.022  -0.014 
  (0.820)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.017)  (0.038)  (0.023) 
Mean Years of education in team         0.016  0.004  0.005  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.012  0.072 
  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.050)  (0.011)  (0.341) 
Mean Industry experience in team         0.012*  0.012*  0.044**  0.020+  0.038*  0.345  0.324*  0.002 
  (0.005)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.253)  (0.123)  (0.050) 
Mean Entrepreneurial exp.in team     0.020  0.028  0.011  0.007  0.062  0.046  0.046  -0.345 
  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.082)  (0.116)  (0.034)  (0.160)  (0.253) 
USO dummy (in pooled model)   -0.010   -0.101***  0.006  -0.013*** 
  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.001) 
         
R2 (within)  0.093   0.094   0.073   0.056 
R2 (between)  0.146  0.195   0.242   0.195 
R2 (overall)  0.109   0.156   0.154   0.098 
Firm-year Obs.  265  345  265  345  331  418  331  418 
Unique firms:  74  83  74  83  56  96  56  96 
Wald chi2(42)  93.34***  123.43***  54.43***  93.347*** 